Although there are no dairy ingredients in vegan cheeses, it is possible that the product was made on dairy equipment and therefore cannot be eaten with meat.  A reliable kosher certification will indicate whether or not the vegan cheese is truly pareve and can be eaten with meat.

 

1. There is a halakhic (Jewish law) obligation to do so.  Prayer, from a traditional perspective, operated on two levels.  It is a religious obligation that prescribes what, where, when, and how to pray.  It is known as avodah she-ba-lev, service of the heart, but it is an avodah, a duty and responsibility.  But prayer is also a spiritual, mystical experience, the prayer not of the lips, but, as Rav Kook suggested, the prayer of the soul.  That requires inspiration.  Jewish prayer finds its ultimate expression when the two are merged. 
2. Like any skill, practice and experience help bring us closer to perfection and appreciation.  Why is the minyan so alienating?  Perhaps it’s a problem with the minyan you are attending and you should try others.  Perhaps it's that you haven’t yet learned the rhythms and patterns of communal prayer and, with more investment of time, energy, and learning, you will find meaning, purpose, and understanding.
3. Jewish prayer is fundamentally tefillah ba-tzibbur, communal prayer.  We pray as part of a collective for the needs of the community.  While prayer can be and needs to be personally meaningful, it should not be selfish.  Praying with a group reminds us of that.
4. There are prayers—the most important ones—that we cannot recite privately: kaddish, kedushah, Torah reading.  These are experiences and opportunities that we should not sacrifice.
5. There are times throughout communal prayers that we have opportunities for private reflection, petition, and gratitude.  Seek them out and take advantage of them.
6. Jewish life is not solitary.  It is about community.  Connecting with the other members of the community for a sacred purpose binds us together is special, unique, and holy ways.
7. There is no reason you cannot do both.  Pray with the minyan.  And find opportunities to pray—daily blessings, recitation of Psalms, Torah study, etc.—that speak to you personally.

 

In theory I agree with your sentiments. In fact, the chareidi press is referring to them as "kana'im" (fanatics) and "sikrikim" (after the Sacarii fanatics of the late Second Temple period). However, "a rose by any other name..." Our opinion here won't have much of an impact on this small group that is giving the majority of chareidim a bad name. The best any of us can do--and must do!--is to express our opinions clearly and loudly in order to educate others to understand what we believe Judaism and Torah really stand for. 

Hoshana Rabbah is the seventh and last day of Sukkot. Although it is not mentioned in the bible, it gets its name because more hoshanot (Hosannas) are recited on this day than all the previous days of the holiday. On Hoshana Rabbah we perform an ancient custom which dates back to the days of the biblical prophets, the beating of the aravah, willow branch. It is considered a day of judgment, the final one in the High Holiday season, and thus the cantor wears a white kittel (robe) and extra petitionary prayers are added to the service. In the morning services of Hoshanna Rabbah, following Musaf (and some places after hallel) the hoshanot are recited as the congregation marches around the bima seven times, after which comes the beating of the aravah, willow branch. The aravahs are beaten against the floor five times.

 

 

I do not believe that there is a moral issue here. The Torah’s prohibition is against eating certain foods, not against their tastes. According to most, there is nothing intrinsically wrong or evil with these forbidden items; they are restricted by divine decree for God’s own reasons. (Those more mystically inclined will disagree with this, maintaining that nonkosher foods contaminate the soul. Nevertheless, permitted foods of exotic flavors would not have the same impact.) In fact, the Midrash explains that a person should not say, “I can’t eat pork, it disgusts me. Rather that person should say, “I’d love to eat it, but what can I do, the Torah prohibits it.”

 

As we see, there is a long tradition of living within the law yet experiencing the fullness of the world—and maybe that’s the idea. Over the years, we have developed non-dairy milk, non-meat meat, vegetarian liver, fake shrimp, pareve margarine, etc. In order to overcome the marit ayin (suspicion) issue, the Sages require that some sort of distinguishing sign be present when we eat these things. The SHulchan Arukh rules that when consuming pareve almond juice (looks like milk) along with meat, that there be almonds on the table. When pareve margarine or creamer were first used, rabbis insisted that they be served in their original wrappers and containers. These foods are now so widespread that there are no suspicions when seeing someone use them.

 

I’m sorry to hear of your loss and of the difficulties and disagreements that have ensued. 

There are a number of factors that need to be considered and balanced in addressing this situation.

Whose obligation was it to pay for your mother’s health care expenses?

Technically, while children have an obligation to honor a parent and to provide for that parent’s needs, the financial burden—if possible—is mi-shel av, payable from the parent’s assets (Talmud, Kiddushin 32a; Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 240:5).  Thus, if asked at the time, I believe Jewish law would have agreed to the original arrangements that you proposed.  And, if that were to have happened, the estate would have consisted of whatever funds remained after those expenses had been met. (Thus, all of you would “be out” your 25% and none of you would have assumed financial responsibility.)

Is your brother eligible for reimbursement from the estate?

From the way I understand your description of the circumstances, your brother unilaterally undertook a personal obligation to pay the expenses, and there was no understanding on your mother’s part or on the parts of you and your siblings to reimburse him.  As such, even if his intent at the time was to be reimbursed, devarim she-ba-lev einam devarim (mental reservations or conditions that are not stipulated at the time of a contract) are generally not binding and have no legal force (Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 207:4).  Especially in this case, when your brother explicitly expressed that he did not want your mother’s assets used for her health care.  Accordingly, it appears that he is not entitled to make a claim against the estate.

What is the status of the assets now?

According to Jewish law, inheritance occurs automatically at the time of the parent’s death.  As such, your share is yours according to Jewish law and anyone who appropriates it without your consent would be guilty of theft.

The matter is much more complicated legally, economically, emotionally, and familially, but I believe these answers outline the basic approach to the technical issues.

 

Rabbi Mark Dratch

Your question is so laden with political bias that I cannot answer it directly.  Clearly, we have an obligation to evaluate scientific matters in unbiased ways and then to respond accordingly. 

 Although Adam was given the earth “to fill and conquer” (Gen.1), he was also mandated to “work and protect” the Garden of Eden (Gen. 2).  The biblical prohibition of bal tashchit proscribes any wanton destruction of natural resources.  And good old common sense (sevara also creates biblical mandates) teaches that we ought to take care of our environment…this is the only (physical) world we have.  What are our obligations?  To live sensitively and responsibly.  To educate and motivate others to do the same.  To engage in the political process in order to help shape legislation in the manner we believe is consistent with the best of science and the best of our Torah’s teachings. 

"A life of truth and justice should necessarily be more acceptable even if it might appear less profitable than one of falsehood and wickedness, as the Sages said in the Book of Proverbs, 'Buy the truth and sell it not' (23:23). Know that these qualities constitute the ornaments of the soul which endow the body with strength, confidence, and permanence."

 
So wrote Rambam in his Letter of Moral Instruction to his son, Abraham.  And so defines the lives of moral decency and integrity which we should strive to live.  The Torah is clear in its expectations: "You shall not bear false witness" (Exodus 20:13), "Keep far from a false matter" (Exodus 23:7), and "Neither shall you deal falsely nor lie to one another" (Leviticus 19:11).  Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel, in Pirkei Avot 1:18, ranked the truth, along with peace and justice, as one of the fundamental principles of society;  and the Midrash lists deception as the first of seven types of robbery.   Deceiving another person tantamount to deceiving God.  (For a general overview see my article, “Nothing But the Truth?" Judaism 37:2 (Spring 1988): 218-229.)

Easier said than done!  Too often personal interests and selfish concerns get in the way, and deceit is all too often a tool in achieving personal gain and benefit.  Deception can give us an unmerited advantage over those with whom we do business or with whom we deal throughout our day, making those dealings more profitable and advantageous.  Anyone who deceives another by word or by action violates the proscription of geneivat da’at, which is, according to most authorities, a Torah prohibition. (Hilkhot De’ot 2:6; Hilkhot Mekhirah 18:1) 

The source of the prohibition of geneivat da’at is either rooted in the verse, “You shall not steal” (Leviticus 19:11) or "Keep far from a false matter" (Exodus 23:7).   Although, in the first instance, the stealing prohibition restricts illicit appropriation of money or property from another, since the Torah formulates it in the plural, lo tignovu, it is understood to include constraints on fraud and deception as well.  This prohibition applies universally, without discrimination, making no difference whether the deceived is a Jew or a non-Jew.   In fact, deceiving a non-Jew or a nonobservant Jew may raise an additional concern of Hillul Hashem, desecration of God’s Name. (See my article on Hillul Hashem at http://www.jsafe.org/pdfs/Hillul_Hashem.pdf.

When deceit is employed in the conduct of business, in addition to the geneivat da’at injunction, a deceiver may also violate the prohibitions against theft and ona’ah, “You shall not defraud one another” (Lev. 25:17).   The prohibition of fraud maintains when a merchant overcharges for the merchandise he sells or when he misrepresents the quality or the nature of those products. (Bach to Hoshen Mishpat 228; Sema, no. 7; Responsa Rivash, no. 403.)  Therefore, Jewish law requires a merchant to inform his customers of hidden flaws and imperfections in the merchandise that he is selling.  (Hil. Mekhirah chapter 8; Hoshen Mishpat 228:6.) Likewise, he may not improve the cosmetics of older, used merchandise if his intention is to mislead the purchaser by giving the product a newer appearance. (Hoshen Mishpat 228:9.)  This prohibition applies even when there is no financial loss to the consumer.  And misrepresenting the quality or nature of a product is forbidden, even if sold at a fair price.  

Not all of the restrictions are absolute.  There are circumstances when deception is permitted—and even mandated.  For example, if the deceiver’s intention is not to acquire personal benefit, but is, rather, to show honor and respect to another person, deception is permitted.  Additionally, geneivat da'at, does not apply when the other person deceives himself;  one is not necessarily obligated to correct a misimpression. (Hullin 94b.  See Aaron Levine, “False Goodwill and Halakha,” Tradition 34:1, Spring, 2000.)  The criterion is simple: what is it that a reasonable person would expect?  If a customer’s mistaken assumption is in opposition to what is most reasonable, then there is an obligation for the merchant to correct his misimpression and to tell him the unvarnished truth.  (Tosafot, Hullin 94b, s.v., inhu de-ka matu anafshaihu.  See also Aaron Levine, Case Studies in Jewish Business Ethics (New York: Yeshiva University Press/Ktav Publishing House, 2000), pp. 21-22, 38-39, 120-121.)

One may also engage in otherwise forbidden deceit if one’s intention is to neutralize an unwarranted or unfair prejudice.   For example, a man whose hair is grey and who is fearful that this may be detrimental in obtaining employment, may dye his beard in order to make himself  appear younger.  This is only allowable only if the individual is young enough and able enough to perform the required work, otherwise it is forbidden. (See Levine, Case Studies, p. 330.) 

If the deceived should have known or could have reasonably known the true facts of the situation and either deceives himself or does not make the effort to discover the truth, it is not the responsibility of the second party to set him straight.  It is considered as if he deceived himself.   In addition, all of this applies only when the second party has a right to know the information.  Business negotiations often depend upon one party having superior information to the other.  Withholding such information is not necessarily deemed to be deceptive; it is only forbidden when the second party has a right to know what the first party knows and geneivat da’at obtains only when the information that is shared misrepresents the product or the facts.  Therefore, lying explicitly when asked about prior drug use—if such questioning is legal in the first place—is a violation of the geneivat da’at prohibition; one must answer truthfully.  Certainly one can explain the circumstances of the situation, one's further track record, any regrets, etc.  But if you inhaled...

It is interesting to note that Rambam records the laws of geneivat da’at in two separate places in his code of Jewish law, Mishneh Torah.  The first, in Hilkhot De’ot 2:6:

It is forbidden to accustom oneself to smooth speech and flatteries. One must not say one thing and mean another. Inward and outward self should correspond; only what we have in mind should we utter with the mouth. We must deceive no one, not even an idolater... even a single word of flattery or deception is forbidden. A person should always cherish truthful speech, an upright spirit, and a pure heart freed of all pretense and cunning.

    And the second is found in Hilkhot Mekhirah, the section on business laws, 18:1, “It is forbidden to swindle anyone in business or to deceive them.”  Why did Rambam separate these two paragraphs?  Why did he need to mention this prohibition twice?  Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein suggested that the purpose of Hilkhot Mekhirah is to teach us how a community is to be structured and addresses itself to how its members should interact within it. Hilkhot De’ot is addressed directly to the individuals themselves and is concerned about their moral integrity and welfare, and the impact of deceit on their own spiritual personalities.  

    And so, geneivat da’at and ona’at devarim have a double negative result.  They harm others, obstructing the smooth functioning of social and business discourse.  But they also damage the individual him/herself, significantly harming his/her own spiritual and moral wellbeing. 


  In Leon D. Stiskin, Letters of Maimonides (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1977), pp. 145-6.
 
  Mikhilta, Mishpatim, parasha 13. 
  Tosefta, Baba Kama ch. 7.
  Hilkhot De’ot 2:6; Hilkhot Mekhirah 18:1; Sha’arei Teshuvah of Rabbeinu Yonah, sha’ar 3, 184.  Some authorities, however, maintain that deception is prohibited rabbinically, see Semak 261; Bah, Hoshen Mishpat 228; Shulhan Arukh ha-Rav, Hilkhot Ona’ah 12.
  Ritva to Hullin 94a.
  Sha’arei Teshuvah, sha’ar III, no. 184.
  Ritva to Hullin 94a (quoting Ba’alei Tosafot).  See Encyclopedia Talmudit, VI, 225-231.
  Ritva to Hullin 94a; Mordekhai to Baba Kama, ch. Ha-Gozel u-Ma’akhil, no. 158 citing Ravia”h; Rambam, Hil. De’ot 2:6; Hoshen Mishpat 228:6.  Some limit the prohibition of deceiving a non-Jew to monetary matters, but not to gifts; others disagree and include gifts as well.  See both opinions in Tosafot, Hullin 94b s.v., amar Abaye.  Ramban and Rashba agree with the former opinion, as does Shakh to Yoreh De’ah 117, no. 13.  Rabbeinu Tam, Rif, Semag, Tur and Rosh maintain the latter.  Bah to Hoshen Mishpat 228, no. 7, posits that one may deceive a non-Jew with words.
  See my article on Hillul Hashem at http://www.jsafe.org/pdfs/Hillul_Hashem.pdf.
  Hil. Mekhirah 18:1; Hoshen Mishpat 228:8; Perishah to Hoshen Mishpat 228, no. 5.
  Bah to Hoshen Mishpat 228; Sema, no. 7; Responsa Rivash, no. 403.
  Hil. Mekhirah chapter 8; Hoshen Mishpat 228:6.
  Hoshen Mishpat 228:9.
  See Maharsha to Hullin 94a where he discusses the interdiction against selling shoes made from the hide of an animal that died of natural causes while claiming that they were made from the stronger hide of an animal that was slaughtered. He explains that seller violates geneivat da’at even if the shoes were sold at a fair price.
  Hullin 94b.  See Aaron Levine, “False Goodwill and Halakha,” Tradition 34:1, Spring, 2000.
  Tosafot, Hullin 94b, s.v., inhu de-ka matu anafshaihu.  See also Aaron Levine, Case Studies in Jewish Business Ethics (New York: Yeshiva University Press/Ktav Publishing House, 2000), pp. 21-22, 38-39, 120-121, "the seller's disclosure obligation consists not only of a duty not to mislead in an affirmative manner but also of a requirement to disabuse the customer of his reasonable misperception about the product."
  Levine, Case Studies, p. 330.
  Hullin 94b; Hoshen Mishpat 228:6; Responsa Maharit, II, Orah Hayyim, no. 8.
  http://www.yu.edu/faculty/emayer/riets_notes/topics_pages/misc.htm