Question: The following question appeared in "the Ethicist " column of the New York Times Magazine. "Some knowledge about hypothermia comes from brutal Nazi medical experiments conducted on prisoners of war. Considering the data came from the destruction of their lives, are there ethical issues when modern-day scientists use it? Could it be considered a form of collaboration with the Nazis? Or does the origin of the data matter if the data is useful? Declaring the data off-limits could lead to preventable deaths, while using the data seems coldheartedly clinical." What is the Jewish response to this seeming dilemma?
We all rightfully recoil with a particular horror from anything associated with Nazi atrocities. The original wrong was an evil act for which there is never any justification. According to Jewish law, pikuaḥ nefesh (saving a life) takes precedence over all of the commandments except for three: In order to save a life one may not commit murder, idolatry, or sexual immorality. It is never acceptable in Jewish law and ethics to derive even the most brilliant and important life-saving information, even if it could save millions of lives, from the deliberate murder of even one person.
However, the results of those horrific experiments now exist. Not using the Nazi scientists’ results will not restore the victims’ lives. Using the knowledge could, in fact, contribute to saving other lives, or at least to avoiding endangering other lives. Doesn’t a scientist have a moral obligation to use all available knowledge to save a life?
Let’s put this in the starkest possible terms. If an emergency room physician has before her a person dying of hypothermia, and knows how to save that person’s life using particular knowledge that came from the Nazi experiments, should the physician use that knowledge? Of course she should. The immediacy of the situation, a clear case of pikuaḥ nefesh, makes it an easy call. But what if the situation is not immediate? Should scientists use that knowledge to design protective gear for astronauts and polar explorers whose lives might be endangered otherwise? If you are tempted to say no, ask yourself: If you were going to be wearing that gear, wouldn’t you want them to use it? The knowledge is there. Not to use it when it could save a life is wrong.
However, there is no question that the knowledge is tainted. It is hana’ah, “benefit,” from grossly immoral and illegal behavior. The questioner is right to feel discomfort. In all situations, therefore, where the knowledge is essential but life is not at stake, there should be an acknowledgement that it comes from a tainted source. For example, the literature that accompanies the hypothetical protective gear should have a prominently displayed notice that it was produced using knowledge that came from Nazi medical experiments. Any scientist who gives a paper or writes an article using the information should prominently feature the same notice. Anyone who wins an award for research based on this knowledge should do the same when receiving the award. In this way, using this knowledge will not become routine, nor the victims forgotten. Indeed, not to use the knowledge for which these POWs were tortured to death would truly render their deaths meaningless.
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Question: A person buys merchandise and pays fair value, only to suspect that the seller may have stolen the goods. The buyer feels guilty about keeping the goods. Throwing them away does not right the situation. Selling them to someone else is no better. Reporting the seller seems hypocritical - there is no evidence. What is the buyer's obligation according to Jewish values? (This question is based on an inquiry appearing in the "New York Times Sunday Magazine" The Ethicist column.)
The buyer in this case has an obligation to right his or her own actions, even if s/he cannot do anything about the suspected theft. S/he apparently did not purchase the merchandise from a store or some other ordinary commercial source, and therefore had an obligation, according to Jewish legal values, to take special care. A buyer has an obligation to avoid purchasing goods in any situation where it is likely that the seller could be selling stolen goods. If there is any way possible, the buyer must return the merchandise to the rightful owner.
If it is impossible to identify or locate the rightful owner, it is still forbidden for the buyer to derive benefit from a crime. Why did the buyer choose to buy from this source rather than from a regular store, or an authorized seller of such merchandise? The buyer claims to have paid “fair market value,” so apparently the benefit was not in getting a low price. If the price was not exceptional, then the merchandise itself must have been exceptional. Did the seller offer some particular merchandise that the buyer coveted? If so, the satisfaction of a covetous desire is the benefit that the buyer may not enjoy. The buyer must not keep the merchandise, because the very fact of possessing it is the buyer’s crime. The buyer must dispossess him/herself of the goods.
Contrary to the buyer's assertion, throwing the goods away would "right the situation" in that the buyer would no longer possess the coveted object. However, even without knowing the nature of the goods, the sheer wastefulness of such a solution mitigates against it. If the goods really have absolutely no distinguishing mark and therefore absolutely cannot be traced to the rightful owner, then the rightful owner from whom they were possibly stolen will have been compelled to give up on recovering them. Ordinarily a person may legitimately claim a lost object with no identifying marks, after a period of time. If these particular goods absolutely cannot be returned to their rightful owner, then this particular buyer can legitimately dispose of them in any way other than by gratifying his or her own covetousness. This buyer could, in good conscience, donate them to a charitable organization that could sell them and use the funds.
In that case, however, the buyer would lose both the goods and the purchase price. While this double loss may salve the buyer’s conscience and serve as a reminder not to do this again, there is another acceptable possibility. If this buyer’s conscience is satisfied that s/he paid “fair market value” for the goods, s/he could even obtain a receipt for that amount as a tax deduction, and thereby recover part of the purchase price. (If this buyer did, after all, get a good deal on the goods, s/he must not claim a higher value for them for tax purposes.)
Finally, while the buyer must be careful not to make unfounded accusations against the seller, if there is any way to remind other prospective buyers to check the legitimacy of any goods offered by this seller, the buyer should do so.
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Question: If a medicine is applied to the skin near the mouth, and some is accidentally swallowed, is it a problem if the ingredients may not be kosher?
[Administrators note: A related question is found at http://www.jewishvaluesonline.org/question.php?id=123.]
If a medicine is applied to the skin near the mouth, and some is accidentally swallowed, is it a problem if the ingredients may not be kosher?
A related question is addressed in the Reform responsa literature (Reform Responsa for the Twenty-First Century, vol. I, #5758.8: “Medical Experimentation: Testing Drugs Made of Pork By-Products”). Here are the relevant elements of that responsum:
1. There is a well-established principle in Judaism called pikuaḥ nefesh, “saving life.” For purposes of saving a life, the law allows – even mandates – that all the commandments may be violated, with the exception of three prohibitions: idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, and murder. The Shulchan Arukh states explicitly that in case of serious (i.e., potentially life-threatening) illness it is permitted to use for healing any of the substances prohibited in the Torah, as long as these three prohibitions are not violated in the process. The reasoning is that in medical circumstances the forbidden substance is not being consumed for its hana’ah (“benefit, enjoyment”) as food.
2. If the illness is not serious, it is still permitted to use a non-kosher substance as a medicine if it is not being consumed as food, but rather administered in some other way, e.g., an injection or cream. Even if it is taken orally, it can be mixed with a bitter substance, so that the patient is clearly taking a medicine and not “enjoying” a food.
In this case, the medicine is not intended for consumption, and even consuming it intentionally would not be food hana’ah. Ingesting it accidentally would certainly not be food hana’ah, so there would be no problem.
However, the questioner does not indicate whether the non-kosher substance is the essential medicinal element or merely the medium to deliver the medicine. If the forbidden food is only the medium, one might argue that there is less need to consume it. An extremely stringent individual might ask if there is an alternative. However, even if the forbidden food is merely the medium for the medicine, it is still true that the person using the medicine does not intend to derive food hana’ah from the forbidden substance, so there is still no problem. In any case, whatever the forbidden food was originally, it has certainly been so chemically altered by processing that it is no longer identifiable as food, and therefore is not a problem.
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Question: Can and should a woman nominate someone to say Kaddish on her behalf?
What is the Kaddish?
The Kaddish “prayer” – actually an affirmation of God’s greatness -- is included in the regular service in several places, where its function is to divide one section of the service from another. It has several different forms, each recited at a particular juncture, e.g., at the conclusion of the Amidah. It is one of the elements of the service for which a minyan is required. Unlike the rest of the liturgy, it is not Hebrew but Aramaic, the vernacular of the rabbinic period, meaning that even the least educated Jews would have understood it.
What is the “Mourners’ Kaddish?”
The “Mourners’ Kaddish” is one of the variant forms of the Kaddish, recited specifically by mourners. According to the halakhah, a person, male or female, is obligated to mourn for any one of the seven immediate relatives: mother, father, daughter, son, sister, brother, spouse. Although the Mishnah and the Talmud are quite specific about the extensive laws of mourning, reciting Kaddish as an act of mourning is not mentioned in either place. That is because reciting Kaddish on behalf of the deceased is a custom that arose in the middle ages, and became more and more important since then, in part because of folklore that stressed the efficacy of the Kaddish in the face of demonic powers, but no doubt also because of its psychological and spiritual benefit as a mode of grieving and healing from grief.
What’s the issue for a woman?
In a traditional context women do not have the obligation to pray three times daily and therefore do not count in the minyan, and therefore cannot lead the service or recite any obligatory section of it on behalf of those who are obligated to recite it. In a traditional context, therefore, a woman may choose to recite the Kaddish from her seat in the women’s section, but that doesn’t “count” toward the requirement of having the Kaddish recited at that point in the service.
Why a substitute to recite the Kaddish?
The Shulḥan Arukh, the authoritative 16th century law code, references the belief that reciting Kaddish releases the soul of the deceased from Gehinnom. As long as Jews viewed the Kaddish in that way, having it recited was less important than who recited it. In the usual course of events the deceased would have living male relatives, so it didn’t matter that a woman could not say it. But for the occasional deceased without immediate male relatives, the solution was to hire a man to recite it in her place. Incidentally, this practice was also adopted by men who could not regularly attend synagogue.
Conclusion
Most Jews have come to see the Kaddish – particularly the customary extended period of reciting it for a parent – as an obligatory act of filial piety and a ritual of psychological and spiritual healing, not as a means of getting Mom or Dad’s soul out of hell. In that context the idea of hiring a substitute makes no sense. Furthermore, in an egalitarian setting, the obligation of reciting Kaddish rests equally on male and female immediate relatives. For both of those reasons, a woman should not have someone recite Kaddish in her place.
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Question: I work in a fast-paced, fairly "cutthroat" world. Is there a Jewish perspective on balancing personal ambitions, and needing to be aggressive to achieve those, with building and maintaining positive relationships with colleagues and co-workers?
The first century sage Hillel said, “If I am not for myself, who will be for me?But if I am only for myself, what am I?”Jewish tradition does not equate poverty with saintliness, but it also does not subscribe to Gordon Gekko’s “greed is good” approach to life.Competition is part of the business world, but competition must be legitimate.It goes without saying that there is no justification whatsoever for any sort of dishonesty or underhandedness in your dealings with your co-workers.The bottom line of your relationship with them must be one of honesty.You may not, for example, act like the pre-med students I used to hear about in the pre-internet days, who would cut articles out of reserve books at the library to gain an advantage on an exam by making it impossible for their classmates to access the material.
Then there was my friend the pre-med student who missed class because of illness and then found that she had to ask a number of classmates to share the notes of the lectures she missed before she found one who was willing to do so.The others wanted to hold on to the slight advantage they had gained by virtue of attending class when my friend could not.And indeed, they broke no rules by their refusal, nor were they under any legal obligation to help my friend.Sharing the lecture notes with her was middat hasidut, “the quality of kindness.”The Talmud uses this phrase in contexts where the laws that govern the marketplace do not require a certain action, but middat hasidut – what we would call “common decency” – does.
You are not required to forgo opportunities for advancement in your work, as long as they are achieved through honest means.Medieval Jewish communities limited the legal right of other Jews to settle there and do business, because economic avenues for Jews were severely limited, and they knew that if too many householders resided in a community, there would be too much competition and all would suffer.On the other hand, you are expected to temper your competitive action with common decency.Medieval Jews balanced their legal right to exclude newcomers with the knowledge that a Jewish family turned away from their community had limited opportunities elsewhere, and so the right was applied carefully.
In short, there is no absolute rule for where to place the balance between your personal ambition and your relations with co-workers.Rather, the expectation is that you will temper personal advancement with common decency:Be a mensh.The fact that you're asking this question shows that you want to be a mensh. So go ahead and be one. You won't regret it.
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Question: Are there any limitations about having sex during marriage? Is it ok to use birth control?
1. Are there any limitations about having sex during marriage?
First of all, Jewish tradition regards sexual satisfaction within marriage as the right of both parties.Indeed, in the ketubah (marriage contract) one of the obligations the husband takes on is his wife’s sexual gratification.Relations must be consensual, however; unlike some other legal systems, Judaism does not condone marital rape.Jewish law traditionally was written from a male perspective and assumes that the husband will usually take the lead in initiating sexual relations, but rabbinic maxims also remind men that women may also do so, though in a less direct manner.
Second, there are limitations on when a couple may have sex.According to the Torah, contact with a dead body or having certain bodily discharges, including semen and menstrual blood, render the person who has them tamei (m.) or t’mei’ah (f.), “unfit” to come into contact with the sacred precinct of the Temple sanctuary, the offerings, or the kohanim (priests) who officiated in the Temple.Tamei / t’mei’ah is usually translated as “impure” or “unclean,” which has led to the misperception that it is a value judgment on the person or even a moral category.
Since the destruction of the Temple, these laws lost their practical import, though some are still observed in a way that is essentially symbolic.For example, kohanim (men who have priestly descent) are traditionally barred from entering a Jewish cemetery, where they would be walking on ground in which bodies are buried, for other than the funeral of an immediate relative, even though there is no Temple service from which these men would then be disqualified from performing.
However, in addition to including menstrual blood among the bodily discharges that render a person tamei/t’mei’ah (Lev. 15:19-33), the Torah also explicitly forbids a man to have sexual relations with a menstruating woman (Lev. 18:19, 20:18).According to the latter source, the penalty for violation of this law is karet, “extirpation,” usually translated as “cutting off:”…both of them shall be cut off from among their people.”(Karet is punishment at the hand of God for certain deliberately committed transgressions such as idolatry, desecrating Shabbat, eating leaven on Pesach, eating on Yom Kippur, incest, and adultery.Its exact meaning is unclear, but most authorities have shared the view of the early rabbis that it meant premature death [Sifra, Emor 14:4].)Because of these two additional verses, the prohibition of sexual relations with a menstruating woman retained its force even after the destruction of the Temple, even though the reason for it – that the man should not become tamei – no longer applied.
Without a doubt the fact that the laws of niddah (“the menstruant”) were the most stringently applied laws of tum’ah (“unfitness”) that were retained in the centuries since the Temple’s destruction, and the fact that they affected every adult Jew, contributed to and strengthened misogynistic strands of thought within Judaism; but it is important to recognize that in their original context they were not uniquely directed at women, but were part of a larger religious legal structure that encompassed relationships between both men and women and God.
According to the Torah, a woman is a niddah, “menstruant,” for seven days from the time she first sees menstrual blood, during which period she is t’mei’ah; on the eighth day, if her bleeding has ceased, she is tehorah (again, misleadingly translated as “clean” or “pure”).However, over time the rabbinic interpretation of the law became more stringent, with the result that a woman is considered niddah for the presumed five days of her actual menstrual flow, or longer if necessary, plus an additional seven days, after which she must immerse in the mikveh before she and her husband can resume relations.
Although nineteenth century Reformers did not discuss niddah, they explicitly rejected the observance of all laws having to do with the Temple, on the grounds that these could have no spiritual meaning for modern people.Over the course of the twentieth century, however, and now in the twenty-first, Reform Jews have rediscovered meaning in many practices they once rejected.While very few couples choose to observe niddah, particularly in the stringent way it evolved in the halakha, some have chosen to observe it in the biblical fashion.
What meaning do they find?It attunes them more closely to their bodies and the rhythms of life, sensitizing them to the wondrousness of life and reverence for its Creator.Also, they find that a monthly enforced break from sexual relations leads them to deepen the emotional aspects of their relationship, and gives them a renewed sexual appreciation for each other.
Third, there are some disagreements regarding types of sexual activity.Rabbinic law regards seminal emission by masturbation as a very serious offense, despite the absence of an explicit prohibition in the Torah.For some authorities, any emission of semen outside the vagina also constituted hash’hatat zera, “wasting seed,” and they therefore prohibited, or at least discouraged, fellatio and anal intercourse.These tend to be restrictive also with regard to cunnilingus.Other authorities held that all forms of sexual activity were legitimate between a married couple.
2. Is it ok to use birth control?
Here’s an excerpt from Mark Washofsky’s book Jewish Living:a Guide to Contemporary Reform Practice (NY:UAHC, 2001), p. 242:
“According to Jewish tradition, it is a mitzvah, a religious duty, to have children.Yet tradition recognizes that there are times when a couple might justifiably not be prepared to have children or to increase the size of their family, and it acknowledges that sexual intercourse within marriage carries a value of its own even when it does not and cannot lead to procreation.For these reasons, Jewish law permits the use of birth control methods, including artificial contraceptives, under these circumstances.
“Reform Judaism respects the right of parents to determine how many children they shall have, although we emphasize that bringing Jewish children into the world remains a special mitzvah and encourage couples to consider the matter of family size carefully and with due regard to the problem of Jewish survival.We discourage such permanent methods of birth control as sterilization and vasectomy.”
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Question: What are the basic differences between Christianity and Judaism (apart from the Christian belief in the divinity of Jesus Christ)? How do these differences show up in what we are told is ethical and correct behavior?
What are the basic differences between Christianity and Judaism (apart from the Christian belief in the divinity of Jesus Christ)?
1. The basic differences
a. Covenant: Judaism conceptualizes the relationship between God and the world as a covenantal one, i.e., one based on mutually agreed-upon and binding conditions. The covenant between God and Israel, established first with Abraham and realized fully at Sinai, commits the people of Israel to strive to live as a holy society by following the teachings and commandments of Torah, and commits God to watch over and protect them as they do so.
Christianity holds that God’s incarnation in the person of Jesus Christ constitutes a new covenant with humanity that supersedes and nullifies the covenant with Israel at Sinai. In place of the Sinai covenant, Christianity holds, God has now established a new covenant with all humanity: Jesus, the Son of God, made atonement for all human beings’ sin through his death on the cross. In order to become party to this new covenant one need only accept the premise that Jesus died to atone for one’s sin. Acceptance of this premise is effected ritually by baptism; the evidence that one has truly accepted it that one’s conduct and character from then on are moral, ethical, and virtuous, reflecting the qualities that Jesus manifested in his lifetime.
Judaism also holds that God cares for the whole world, as shown in the covenant with Noah and his children after the Flood, and that all human beings, therefore, are obligated to adhere to basic standards of ethical conduct. It is, therefore, not necessary to be Jewish in order to have a relationship with God. In the classical Christian view, however, a person must accept the “new” covenant made through Jesus in order to be “saved,” i.e., in order to have a relationship with God.
b. Human nature and sin: It is significant that there are no references anywhere else in the Tanakh (Hebrew Bible) to Adam and Eve and the Garden of Eden. This story did not play a significant role in biblical theology. Classical Judaism sees death as the evil consequence of eating of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, and while there is a strand of misogynistic midrash on Eve, it does not play a central role in Jewish thought. Human beings, in the Jewish view, are created with the capacity to do either good or evil. This is expressed through the rabbinic concepts of yetzer ha-tov, the “good inclination,” and the yetzer ha-ra, the “evil inclination.” Judaism understands “sin” as evil behavior, not as a theological state of being.
Classical Christian thought considers sex to be the great evil consequence of eating the fruit of the tree, and places the primary responsibility for it on the woman. Sexual intercourse is therefore inherently tainted, since it would not have occurred but for Eve’s disobedience. All human beings, therefore, are born in sin, and this sin can only be atoned for through the atonement provided by Jesus’s death on the cross. Thus Jesus is seen as the “new Adam,” the counterweight to the sinful first man. “Sin” is both behavior but also the state of being of anyone who has not accepted Jesus as their savior and thus had their sinfulness atoned for and forgiven.
c. The messiah: The Hebrew word mashiach means “anointed.” In ancient Israel high priests and kings were anointed with oil when they were inaugurated into their offices. According to the Tanakh, God established a covenant with King David that his descendants would be Israel’s one and only legitimate ruling house. Indeed, the dynasty ruled in Jerusalem for over 400 years (ca. 1000 – 586 BCE), though as the prophetic books attest, not all of them were paragons of virtue. The Davidic dynasty apparently died out just after the return from the Babylonian Exile (536 BCE). At that point Judea was under Persian rule; it passed to Greek control in 332, but won its independence in the struggle that began under the leadership of the Maccabees. The family of Judah Maccabee, known as the Hasmoneans, established an independent kingdom for a short time, but their rule was controversial and many Jews regarded them as illegitimate. There are passages in the prophetic books (e.g., Isaiah 11) criticizing the bad Davidic kings and looking forward to the accession of good ones under whom God’s laws would be followed and the kingdom would be prosperous and at peace. It was probably during the reigns of the Hasmoneans that Jews began reading these passages and interpreting them to refer to the reappearance of the Davidic dynasty in the person of a good king. This longing for a melekh mashiakh, an “anointed (i.e., legitimate Davidic) king” intensified as Hasmonean Judea fell under Roman domination and conditions in Judea worsened. Ultimately there were a variety of Jewish notions about what would happen when the “messiah” arrived, but all have at least these in common: 1) the ingathering of the Jewish people from exile; 2) the reestablishment of a sovereign Jewish nation under a restored Davidic monarchy; and 3) the rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem, destroyed by Rome in 70 CE at the conclusion of the first Jewish revolt. Most also envision a time of peace and harmony. Apparently the followers of Jesus believed that he was the promised descendant of David and therefore the “anointed” one (Christos, in Greek). However, he did not accomplish what the majority of Jews expected the mashiach to accomplish. His followers, faced with this cognitive dissonance, resolved the contradiction by reinterpreting the concept of mashiach: It was necessary, they held, for the “messiah” to come not once, but twice – the first time to suffer and die for humanity, and the second time to usher in the “kingdom of God."
d. The commandments: For Jews, the mitzvot (commandments) of the Torah are the means by which a loving and caring God enables them to live a life of holiness, i.e., of intentionality in deed that deepens the individual’s relationship to God and perfects the conduct of individuals and society. The earliest followers of Jesus were Jews who shared this view. However, ultimately the early church became a movement dominated by gentiles who found the rituals of Judaism unappealing, and it adopted the view of Paul, that the ritual commandments of the Torah were superfluous, and that all that mattered was to accept the atoning death of Jesus. This has led over the centuries to an extensive Christian polemic against Jewish ritual.
2. How do these differences show up in what we are told is ethical and correct behavior?
This question requires either a book or a very brief answer; I will opt for the latter. The difference between Judaism and Christianity in the realm of ethical behavior is more largely a matter of emphasis and attitude. The Torah presumes that the long-term continuity of human society is both a given and a desideratum, and therefore is concerned with social ethics, the judicial process, civil and criminal law, and so forth. The Christian Scriptures (the “New Testament”) were written by individuals who expected the imminent return of Jesus, the end to society as they knew it, and the ushering in of a radically new and different era, the “kingdom of God.” They did not care, therefore, about the orderly maintenance of society. A person should give everything away to the poor, abandon his livelihood, leave his family – because in a short while none of these would matter. Of course, Jesus did not return, and the church had to develop a system of rules for conduct in the interim until the Second Coming. But the divergent origins of the two scriptures have bequeathed to each tradition a distinctive ethos in their approaches to ethics. Very simply put (perhaps overly so): Jews have tended to emphasize adjusting social mechanisms to ensure justice; Christians have tended to value the saintly individual who abandons his or her own private life and devotes it to those in need.
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